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MANUAL WORK, TECHNOLOGY, AND
INDUSTRIAL HEALTH, 1918-39
by
A. J. McIVOR*
Workers' healthintheinter-waryearshasbeenthesubjectofrecentenquiryandwas
a topic that generated much contentious contemporary debate.' The focus of
discussionhasbeentheimpact ofmassunemploymentandconsequentdeprivation on
standards ofhealth, physique, and general well-being. The object here is to open up a
further, so farvery neglected dimension, by switchingattention to theworkplace, and
investigating the theme of health at work in the 1920s and 1930s.2 The present
generation has grown up with the knowledge that work, working conditions, and
technology may seriously affect the mental and physical health and well-being of
individual workers, and that health, fitness, and fatigue can considerably influence
productivitylevelsandefflciency. Evidenceofthesecorrelations accumulated withthe
practical work ofthe Factory Inspectorate from the 1830s, theweight ofexperience of
a relatively thin strand ofwelfarist, humanitarian employers (ofthe G. Cadbury and
S. Rowntree genre), and the experimentation of "scientific management" theorizers,
including the Americans, F. W. Taylor (time study) and F. and L. Gilbreth (motion
study).3 However, an important contribution to the industrial health and efficiency
debate was also made by the research organizations established by the British
govemment during the crisis years of World War I and its aftermath, under the
auspices ofthe recently created Medical Research Committee (MRC). The Industrial
HealthResearchBoard(IHRB)wasformedinJuly 1918: "Toconsiderandinvestigate
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the relationship of the hours of labour and of other conditions of employment;
including methods of work, to the production of fatigue, having regard both to
industrial efficiency and to the preservation of health amongst the workers."4
This essayexamines the impact ofwork organizationand theworkenvironment on
employees' health, focusinginparticularontheoriginsandworkoftheIHRBfromits
formation (astheIndustrial Fatigue Research Board)throughthe 1920sand 1930s.5 It
isbasedlargelyonthesurvivingarchivesandreports oftheBoard, heldbytheMedical
Research Council in London. Section I examines the genesis of the Board and the
circumstances surrounding its formation andcomposition. Section II investigates the
work ofthe Board, itsorientation and rolein the 1920s and 1930s. Finally, Section III
analyses thedissemination ofresearchfindings and newideas onindustrialhealthand
efficiencyandrelatesthistogeneraltrendsinworkorganisation,technologicalchange,
and health at work in the inter-war years.
I
The IHRB emerged from the experience gained in industrial health, efficiency, and
the management of labour during World War I, with the mass influx of women
workers into war industries. Before 1914, physiological and psychological health at
work was severely neglected by the vast majority ofBritish managers and employers,
mostofwhomwereconcernedonly to staywithinthelegallimitsoftheFactoryActs.6
Researchintothescientificbasisofindustrialfatigue,efficiency,andhealthwasonlyin
its infancy, with the result that individual worker productivity was relatively poor,
certainlyinmanycasesfarfromachievingitsfullpotential.7 Thiswastheconsequence
partly ofexcessive energyexpenditure atwork, exacerbated by relatively poorgeneral
standards ofhealth, as indicated in the Report ofthe Interdepartmental Committee on
PhysicalDeterioration of1904, which had beenestablished to investigate thecauses of
theveryhighrejection ratesofwould-bearmyrecruitsonhealthandphysiquegrounds
during the Boer War.
It was the First World War, 1914-18, however, that really brought the debate on
industrial health and efficiency into the public arena. Within a year ofthe first shots
being fired, the British war effort was facing serious problems on the "home front"
because the productivity of munitions workers was declining as a consequence of
accumulatedandinmanycaseschronicfatigue. Workershadcommonlybeenengaged
in a 75-85-hour working week over 1914-15, with little consideration for the
long-term effects this would have on health or efficiency. By the summer of 1915, the
government had recognized that serious deficiencies existed in wartime labour
management and in September 1915 set up the Health of Munitions Workers'
4Industrial Fatigue Research Board, Annual Report, London, HMSO, 31 March 1920, p. 29.
5 Forconvenience and toavoidconfusioninthetexttheinitials IHRBareused throughout, whilstinthe
notes IFRB is used to 1928 (the year of the name change) and IHRB thereafter.
6 M. M. Niven, Personnel management, 1913-63, London, Institute of Personnel Management, 1967,
pp. 15-18.
7 Engineer, London, 14 November 1913, p. 521; J. A. Hobson, 'Scientific management', Sociol. Rev.,
1913,7: 198-199. Forageneraldiscussionoflabourmanagementinthepre-1914periodseeC. R. Littler, The
development ofthe labour process in capitalist societies, London, Heinemann, 1982, pp. 80-98.
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Committee (HMWC) to investigate exhaustively the "laws" governing industrial
health and efficiency.
Over a period of two years, the HMWC carried out a series ofpioneering works
studies, commissioningphysiologists, psychologists, statisticians,medicalresearchers,
and industrial hygiene specialists to undertake scientific experiments into aspects of
industrial medicine, health, efficiency, and fatigue. In its findings the HMWC
indicated a clear relationship between excessive working hours, a worker's "fatigue
threshold", and declining productivity levels. The Committee also elaborated on the
correlation between general working conditions-adequate illumination, ventilation,
seating,washing,sanitary, and safetyarrangements-andproductivitylevels,andalso
on the links between nutrition, environmental factors, and efficiency.8 J. C. Bridge,
SeniorMedicalInspectorofFactories,reflectedsomeyearslaterthatthiswasacrucial
phaseintheevolutionofindustrialmedicine: "Duringthisperioditwasrealisedforthe
firsttimethatconditionsspecialtotheoccupationwerenottheonlycauseofindustrial
disease, butthatotherfactors-fatigue, under-nourishment, and otherconditions met
with both inside and outside the time of employment-were as important in the
production ofillness as those produced by the materials handled."9
Theprimary objectofthe HMWC was to find the optimumworkinghours, general
working conditions, and external environment to achieve the highest productivity
standards for the wareffort whilst preserving workers' health and well-being so as to
sustain levels of effort over what was anticipated by 1915 to be a long emergency
period. Thegovernmentincorporated anumberoftheCommittee's recommendations
intoitswartimelabourmanagementdecisions-includingreducedworkinghoursand
the abolition of Sunday working. Much of the Committee's research, however,
remained relativelynarrowin focus, its terms ofreference beingconfined solely to the
munitions industry. By 1917, a number of HMWC members and industrial health
specialists werelobbyingfortheestablishmentofamuchmorebroadly basedresearch
organization to investigate industrial health, preventive medicine, and worker
efficiency on an economy-wide basis.
Therefore, on the disbandment of the HMWC at the end of 1917, the Medical
Research Committee and the Department ofScientific and Industrial Research, with
the active encouragement and financial backing of the Home Office, formed the
Industrial Health Research Board (IHRB) to investigate industrial health and fatigue
on more comprehensive lines by embracing all classes of work within its scope of
research. WalterFletcher, SecretaryoftheMRC,wasresponsible formostoftheearly
organizational work. He immediately recognized that the composition of the new
Boardand theearlystages ofitsworkwerecrucialifgoodrelations forthefuturewere
to be assured with both workers and employers. As he astutely noted in August 1918:
8 See, in particular, the Health ofMunitions Workers' Committee (HMWC), Final Report, Industrial
health andefficiency, London, HMSO, Cd. 9065, 1918, and the21 Memorandaprinted by the HMWC. For
an interesting analysis ofone ofthe best-publicized munitions-related health problems see A. Ineson and
D. Thom, 'TNT poisoning and the employment ofwomen workers in the First World War', in Weindling,
op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 89-107.
9 Annual Report of the ChiefInspector ofFactories and Workshops, for 1932, Cmd. 4377, London,
HMSO, 1933, p. 55. Hereinafter referred to as Factory Inspector's Report.
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"We shallcertainly have to go 'canny' for some time at thebeginning".'0 The Board's
initial sensitivity towards antagonizing the trade unions was clearly indicated when it
refusedtosupporttheongoingresearchofH. M.Vernonintodeliberateworkeroutput
restriction in theshipyards."1 Fletcherwas also keen from the outset to ensure that no
connexion was made between the emerging British "fatigue studies" school and the
American scientific management movement, which tended, he asserted, towards
exploiting workers with the object ofmaximizing profit margins, and to take a very
mechanical, instrumental view of the workman as "only a human machine".12 In a
letter to J. R. Clynes, Labour leader in Parliament, Fletcher elaborated on his own
conception ofwhat the orientation ofthe British "fatigue studies" group should be:
"The study, rightly conceived, and its results rightly applied must bring, I am
convinced, its chiefbenefits to the workers themselves. We must make every effort to
start from the beginning in fullest sympathy with the workers, and we can do little or
nothing without their help, both in the study and in its applications." 3
Throughout 1918 andtheearlypartof1919, aninterimcommitteeofthe Boardwas
canvassing for suitably qualified members. A number of interested organizations
suggested names. George Cadbury's Anti-Sweating League nominated Charles
Renold-an indication of the esteem in which the enlightened firm of Renold &
Companywasheld.14Renold,however,wasnotthefinalchoice,forFletcherpreferred
to invite a representative ofMather & Platt, the Manchester engineering firm which
hadpioneeredthestudyofindustrial fatigueinthe 1890s.'5E. Hopkinson,adirectorof
Mather & Platt and a junior partner of William Mather in his 48-hour week
experiment, duly accepted a position on the Board. C. S. Sherrington, Professor of
Physiology atthe UniversityofOxford, wasappointedchairman,'6 and D. R. Wilson,
Factory Inspector (later ChiefInspector), secretary. Othermembers were E. L. Collis,
Talbot Professor of Preventive Medicine, Cardiff; W. L. Hitchens, chairman of
Cammell Laird&Co. Ltd; KennethLee,directorofTootal BroadhurstLee&Co. Ltd;
C. S. Myers, Director of the Psychological Laboratory, Cambridge (and, in 1920,
founderoftheNationalInstituteofIndustrialPsychology); T. M. Legge, HM Medical
Inspector ofFactories (since 1898); and R. R. Bannatyne and B. Wilson as Assessors
from the Home Office and the Ministry of Labour respectively.'7
Fletcherclaimed thatheintended tohavesomefemalerepresentation onthe Board,
but confessed in January 1919 to difficulty in finding candidates with training in
physiology or medicine and some familiarity with industrial work.18 This brought a
10 Letter, W. Fletcher to H. M. Vernon, 19August 1918, Medical Research Committee(MRC)Archives,
PF 30.
11Letter, H. M. Vernon to W. Fletcher, 20 August 1918, ibid.
12 Letter, W. Fletcher to J. R. Clynes, 7 January 1918, ibid., PF 20.
13Ibid.
14 Letter, National Anti-Sweating League to W. Fletcher, 8 January 1918, ibid., PF 26.
15 Letter, W. Fletcher to E. Hopkinson, 24 June 1918, ibid., PF 20.
16 Sherrington wasappointed because he was oneoftheforemostphysiologists in Britain and becauseof
his prior investigations into industrial fatigue for the War Office in 1914-18. He was also a very close
personal friend ofWalter Fletcher. See H. M. Sinclair, 'Sherrington and industrial fatigue', Notes Rec. R.
Soc. Lond., 1984, pp. 91-104.
7 Letter, G. Bellhouse to M. Delevingne, 1 July 1918, MRC Archives, PF 22.
18 Letter, W. Fletcher to Lady Rhondda, 15 January 1919, ibid., PF 20.
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torrent of criticism and nominations from women's representatives and groups,
including Millicent Garret Fawcett's National Union ofWomen's Suffrage Societies,
Lady Rhondda (who embarrassed the Board with a vitriolic letter in The Times), and
the MedicalWomen's Federation.'9 DrBeatriceWebband Mrs Stracheywereamong
the suggestions.20 Fletcher responded by inviting Mona Wilson and Winifred Cullis,
bothofwhomacceptedandjoinedtheBoardinthespringof1919. Culliswasprofessor
of physiology at the University of London and Wilson was known for her pre-war
work as secretary ofthe Women's Trade Union League and for a number ofworks
including Reporton housingandindustrialconditions (1905) and (with E. G. Howarth)
West Ham: a study in social and industrialproblems (1907).21
Consequently, the ultimate composition ofthe IHRB was similar to the HMWC,
combining representatives ofthe universities, industry, the Factory Inspectorate, the
MRC, the Home Office, and the Ministry of Labour. Despite Fletcher's sensitivity
towards tradeunion support, officialunion representation on the Boardwasminimal,
andthismayhaveexacerbated thesuspicion ofthelabourmovementtowardsitswork.
In 1924, this oversight wascorrected to adegree with the appointment to the Board of
ArthurPugh, General Secretaryofthe Ironand SteelTradesFederation, succeeded by
Ernest Bevin (Transport and General Workers' Union) and Richard Coppock
(National Federation of Building Trade Operatives) in the 1930s.
The Board underwent other changes in its composition throughout the inter-war
period. With reorganization in 1920-1 and the MRC assuming full control,
Sherrington resigned, and William Graham, who was a member ofthe MRC and an
Edinburgh LabourMP,wasappointedchairman. Grahamwassucceededaschairman
by Viscount D'Abernon (1926-9), financier, diplomat (first ambassador to Weimar
Germany), and, in 1929, chairman of the MRC. A Conservative MP with an army
background, Lt-Col. Sir Arnold T. Wilson, took over the chair 1929-33. He was
replaced byamanwhowasprobablythemostableofIHRBchairmen, Professor E. P.
Cathcart, an industrial specialist, applied physiologist and Regius Professor of
Physiology at Glasgow University. Some continuity regarding the Board's work was
achieved through the work of the secretary. The inter-war period is divided almost
equally between thesecretaryship ofD. R. Wilson(1918-30)andAir-Vice-Marshal Sir
David Munro (1930-42). Wilson was a Factory Inspector (later, Chief Inspector,
1932-40) and a specialist in illumination and humidity; Munro had been Director of
Medical Services, RAF. As far as the general composition ofthe Board is concerned,
therewasafairlyrapid turnoverofpersonnel, noneoftheoriginal Board, forexample,
remained in 1930. However, the mix of interests seems to have remained fairly
constant. Apart from Cathcart, Munro, and Bevin in the late 1930s, the Board
included SirF. J. Marquis(politician andbusinessman, managingdirectorofLewis's),
Hilda Martindale (Factory Inspectorate), Professor C. Burt (London psychologist),
Professor F. C. Bartlett (Cambridge psychologist), C. G. Douglas (Oxford
19 Ibid. See also letter, National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies (NUWSS) to W. Fletcher, 30
January 1919; and letter, J. Walker to W. Fletcher, 3 February 1919, ibid., PF 20.
20 Letter, NUWSS to W. Fletcher, 17 February 1919, ibid.
21 Letter, W. Fletcher to W. Cullis, 25 March 1919, ibid. S. Lewenhak, Women andtrade unions, London,
Benn, 1977, pp. 114, 117, 127.
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physiologist) and Professor W. W. Jameson (preventive medicine specialist and first
Professor ofPublic Health at the London School ofHygiene and Tropical Medicine,
1929).
Whilst the Board determined policy and direction, a cadre of professional
investigators undertook the detailed empirical research into health, efficiency, and
industrial fatigue. Here the links with the HMWC were close, as a number of the
Committee's field workers and researchers, including H. M. Vernon, Professor
T. Loveday, andA. F. StanleyKent, transferred theirservices totheIHRB,usually on
a part-time basis, as many held permanent academic posts. By 1920, the investigating
staff of the Board numbered twenty-five, supported by eleven clerks and several
secretaries.22
II
The role ofthe IHRB was to study scientifically the human factor in industry and
particularly the health and efficiency problems created by modern industrial
conditions and technological change.23 It was not in the business of maximizing
productivityforitsownsake, atanycost, assomeofitsdetractorsargued,24butrather
todiscover, throughscientificanalysis, preciseworkmeasurement, andcalculationsof
energy expenditure at work, the optimum conditions and methods of work for the
operatives. This, both the Board and the Factory Inspectorate argued, provided
common benefits for employers and workmen.25 It also involved a search for the
easiest, mostenergy-conservingmethodsofwork, ratherthannecessarilythequickest,
andbroughttheBoardintoconflictwiththeAmerican-inspiredmaximizingefficiency
engineering school of thought. Indeed, as a component part of the "human factor
industrial psychology" school, the board was responsible for the exposure of what
Rose has called "the scientific crudity ofTaylorism".26
The IHRB was inspired by the wastage that arose from the indifference shown in
Britaintowardsphysiologicalandpsychologicalaspectsofindustry, andtheignorance
ofthe principles governing the healthy employment ofthe human mind and body. It
was pointed out that over ten times as much production time was lost through
sickness-muchofwhichwaspreventable-aswaslostthrough strikesanddisputes.27
Researchinthis areathushadenormouspotential. Thephilosophy ofthe Board from
its earliestdayswas that "maximumproduction iscontingent on maximum fitness on
the part of the worker".28 However, in essence, it was a fact-finding research body
formed to acquire and accumulate scientific knowledge and was not directly involved
in policy decision-making, as it made clear in its first Annual Report: "The object of
22 IFRB, Annual Report, 31 March 1920, pp. 9-10.
23 Editorial by R. Calder, 'New dangers ofthe machine', Daily Herald, 19 March 1934.
24IHRB, Annual Report, 30 December 1928, pp. 22-23; ibid., 30 June 1934, pp. 3-4.
25 IFRB, Annual Report, 30 September 1921, p. 43; ibid., 31 December 1928, p. 18; Factory Inspector's
Report, 1932, Cmd. 4377, p. 9.
26 M. Rose, Industrial behaviour, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin, 1978, pp. 65-66, 84-85.
27 IFRB, Annual Report, 31 December 1924, p. 27; T. Burt, 'Waste in human power', Oxford Lecture
Conferencesfor Works Directors Managers etc., (London School of Economics Library), 22 April 1923,
pp. 38-39. Hereinafter referred to as Oxford Lecture Conferences.
28 IFRB, Annual Report, 31 December 1924, p. 26.
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the Board is to obtain exact facts about fatigue caused by industrial employment in
different trades and underdifferent conditions in the same trade, but the Board is not
itselfconcerned with the alteration ofexisting conditions by legislation or otherwise.
The results obtained will be published, and then it will be possible for persons
employed and others interested to make any suggestions they think necessary for
improved conditions when they have weighed the facts."29 Noting, however, the
crucial need for practical verification of the Board's findings, employers were
encouraged to commit themselves to extended scientific investigation within their
companies to improve labour health and efficiency.30 The stimulation ofthe habit of
experimentation was thus considered to be one of the main objects of the IHRB.
TheworkoftheBoardinvolvedamixoffield-workattheworkplaceandlaboratory
research. It responded to requests from individual industries to investigate labour
efficiency andhealth, andelaborated generalprinciples andhypotheses relating to the
causation, measurement, and incidence ofindustrial fatigue. It concentrated almost
solely on the workplace. Unlike the HMWC, the Board did not investigate external
factors-economic, dietary, social, or educational-which were known to influence
health and industrialefficiency. However, several investigations were taken overfrom
theHMWC,andanumberofnewinitiativesundertakenonrequestfromemployersor
suggestions from the government. Representatives of Joint Industrial Councils,
employers' associations, industrial research associations, and trade unions, together
with one ofthe specialist Factory Inspectors, would usually form a sub-committee to
advise on technical points and criticize or comment on the research progress of the
Board's investigators working in their particular industry.3' Indeed, the Board
encouraged the permanent establishment ofsuchjoint committees in all industries to
discuss questions ofindustrial health andefficiency and medical research transmitted
by the IHRB. This anticipated network ofspecial industry-wide committees proved,
however, to be an ideal that never fully materialized in the 1920s and 1930s.
Theemphasis ofthe IHRB'swork altered in response tocircumstances, as theearly
yearswerefraughtwithdisruptions. The Boardwasformed atatimewhenexcessively
long hours were still being worked during wartime (though the position was much
improved incomparison to 1914-15) andwhen there wasmuch subjective evidence of
extreme fatigue. No sooner, however, hadanumberofinvestigations ontheincidence
ofindustrial fatigue gotunder way, than the warended in November 1918, and in its
aftermath, working hours were almost universally reduced to around 47-48 per
week.32Thebriefpost-warreplacementboomgavewaytoasevererecession,whichset
induringthewinterof1920-21. This notonlyprecipitated areduction in the financial
budget ofthe Board-as part ofthe government's economy drive-but led to further
disruptions, caused by extensive lay-offs and short-time working in industry, shorter
standardized production runs (essential for research purposes), and a tendency
amongst employers and workers to become preoccupied with internal problems and
29Ibid., 31 March 1920, p. 27.
30 Ibid., 31 December 1923, pp. 21-22.
31 Ibid., 31 March 1920, pp. 10-I.
32 Ibid., 31 September 1921, p. 5.
166Manual work, technology, and industrial health 1918-39
lesswillingtoco-operateintheworkoftheIHRB.33Thedepressioncontinued toaffect
the work of the Board adversely throughout the 1920s and 1930s.
Nevertheless, up to 1939 the Board produced eighty-four special research
monographs and numerous articles in the academic and medical press. These
significantly extended the theoretical knowledge in Britain ofthe "human factor" in
industry (which had been largely confined to themunitions/engineering industry) and
indicated, using scientific analysis in a number of different industries and
occupations-including textiles, metals and engineering, mining, boot and shoe,
printing, pottery, laundries, and the leather trade-that productivity was closely
related to the health of the workers. The IHRB started with investigations into the
hours of labour and the working environment, moved into analyses of methods of
work, job design, and vocational psychology, and, by the later 1930s, concentration
was increasingly laid on specific medical topics (including occupational disease).
The false economy ofworking over a certain number of hours, depending on the
mental and physical strain involved in performing the task, was clearly shown by
H. M. Vernon in his pioneering work for the HMWC. Vernon and other IHRB
investigators continued this project by elaborating, for a range of tasks and
occupations, the optimum working hours. Vernon's methods were to chart hourly
output curves by some form of recording production (for example, the use of
automatic pick recorders on looms), identify the incidence of worker fatigue, and
eliminate this as far as possible by experimenting with shorter hours, rest pauses, and
improved working methods and conditions, the result ofclose analysis ofthe labour
process, the technology employed, and the ways in which energy was expended on the
job.34 Organized and systematic rest pauses were one way to arrest the onset of
industrial fatigue. On machine and conveyor operations, for example, it was found
that a pause offive minutes each hour was a far more efficient method than a 10-15
minute tea break in the middle of the work spell.35
The IHRB also publicized the idea that workers' bodies were highly sensitive to
changes in temperature, humidity, noise, and light and that these could have an
extremely variableeffect onefficiency. In anumberofinvestigations into fineandvery
detailedwork,theBoardcalculatedtheappropriate levelsofilluminationaccordingto
the size ofthe detail to be distinguished. Researchers found that in silk-weaving, for
example, productivity was reduced by up to ten per cent where artificial rather than
natural light was used.36 One solution suggested by the Board was the use ofslightly
magnifying spectacles for such categories ofwork.37
33 Ibid., 31 December 1922, pp. 4-5.
34 Ibid., 30 September 1921, pp. 26-29. See also H. M. Vernon, 'The influence ofhours ofwork and of
ventilation on output in tin manufacture', IFRB Report No. 1, London, HMSO, 1919; H. M. Vernon,
'Fatigue and efficiency in the iron and steel industry', IFRB Report No. 5, 1920; and H. M. Vernon and
T. Bedford, 'Rest pauses in heavy and moderately heavy industrial work', IFRB Report No. 41, 1927.
3s IHRB, Annual Report, 30 June 1938, pp. 5-6.
36IFRB, Annual Report, 30 September 1921, pp. 42-43; P. M. Elton, 'A study ofoutput in silk weaving
during the winter months', IFRB Report No. 9, 1920, p. 55.
37 H. C. Weston and S. Adams, 'Further experiments on the use of special spectacles in very fine
processes', IHRB Report No. 57, 1929, pp. 23-26.
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Similarly, the Board developed, through scientific investigation and measurement, a
comprehensive range ofdata on the best temperatures, humidity levels, and air speeds
toproduce thehighestproductivity levels fordifferent occupations and processes. This
work was pioneered by S. Wyatt, A. B. Hill, H. M. Vernon, and T. Bedford, using
various instruments such as the kata-thermometer, developed by Sir Leonard Hill to
measure the combined effects oftemperature and air velocity. Research concentrated
on thehot, heavy industries, including the iron, steel and tinplate trades, coal-mining,
and cotton-weaving.38 Some of the results indicated enormous wastage. In mining,
there was found to be up to a forty-one per cent loss ofefficiency in hot and poorly
ventilated shafts, whilst in one iron and steel works, twelve per cent less was produced
on average in summer than in winter because there was no artificial ventilation.39 In
cotton-weaving, an investigation ofthe records of 10,000 weavers in "steamed" sheds
compared to 10,000 in "dry" sheds indicated that whilst excessive steaming may have
reduced individual efficiency, there was no correlation between sickness incidence and
workers' exposure to "normal" levels ofsteam.40 The statistical basis of the inquiry
was such that both the unions and the employers accepted this as the definitive answer
to a question that had caused much controversy in the industry.41 On the other hand,
the Board did find that in other occupations, atmospheric conditions had a
considerable influence on both sickness- and accident-proneness. Steel-smelters,
puddlers, and pitmen in the iron and steel trades lost twenty-two per cent more time
than the average in their industry due to sickness. Accident-proneness, it was also
found, increased considerably in colder temperatures, due to a loss of manual
dexterity.42
Vibration, dust, and noise were also the subject ofinvestigation in an attempt to
indicate the relationship between such variables and labour productivity. All had
adverse effects in varying quantities, and as a result the Board championed their
elimination in the workplace, or protection against them in the form of localized
dust-extractor systems and ear-protectors. In cotton-weaving, using the traditional
Lancashire looms, eight per cent more production on average was forthcoming when
ear-protectors were used, which eliminated around fifty per cent ofthe noise.43 One
importantfindingwastheconsiderablevariationineachindividual's reaction tonoise,
depending, the Board hypothesized, on the particular psychological make-up ofthe
individual. A. B. Hill also followed up his statistical inquiry into artificial humidity in
cotton-weaving with a similar investigation into the relationship between inhaling
cotton dust in the cardroom (where preparatory processes prior to spinning took
place) and respiratory disease. His results indicated clearly the extremely dangerous
38 See the IFRB Reports, Nos. 21, 37, 39, 46, 48, 60, and 76.
39 IHRB, Annual Report, 30 June 1938, pp. 15-16.
40 Ibid., p. 35. See alsoA. B. Hill, 'Artificial humidificationinthecottonweavingindustry',IFRBReport
No. 48, 1927, p. 72.
41 For example, see the debate in the Cotton Spinners' and Manufacturers' Association, Joint Minutes
(with the Amalgamated Weavers' Association), 16 March 1906.
42 IFRB, AnnualReport, 30 September 1921, pp. 37-8; IHRB, AnnualReport, 30 June 1938, pp. 17-18.
43 H. C. Weston and S. Adams, 'The performance ofweavers under varying conditions ofnoise', IHRB
Report No. 70, 1935, p. 14.
44A. B. Hill, 'Sickness amongst operatives in Lancashire cotton spinning mills', IHRB Report No. 59,
1930, pp. 77-79. See also Factory Inspector's Report, 1930, Cmd. 3927, p. 95.
168Manual work, technology, and industrial health 1918-39
andunhealthyenvironmentofthecardroom,wheretheworkerssufferedthreetimesas
much respiratory disease as workers in other departments.44
The research interests ofthe Board in the 1920s tended to shift from hours ofwork
and environmental conditions to methods of work, job design, and vocational
psychology,aspectsmorecloselyrelatedtothescientificmanagementmovementofthe
American "efficiencyengineers", like F. Taylorand F. Gilbreth. The Boardpioneered
vocational guidance and performance testing in Britain-both physiological and
psychological-developing techniques to ensure that workers were placed in the
occupations forwhichtheywerebestfitted. Beinga"misfit",withnoinherentcapacity
toperform theworktask, lowered aworker's "fatiguethreshold" andwasdetrimental
to health, so vocational selection and training were seen to offset overstrain.45 There
was, moreover, much evidence of workers being physically unsuitable not only for
recruitment into the armed forces, but also for particular work tasks. Professor E. P.
Cathcart undertook a statistical inquiry for the IHRB into the weight, height, and
strength of over 10,000 men in 1933-4, the most comprehensive investigation into
physique since the infamous wartime Ministry of National Service C3 Report of
1917-18.46 He found invariably the smallest men doing the heaviest jobs, a
phenomenon reported in the Daily Workerunder the headline 'Small Men do the Big
Jobs' in March 1934.47 The Board (in conjunction with the National Institute of
Industrial Psychology)pioneered thecataloguing ofvariousoccupations according to
the aptitudes and capacities required in them, and the examination and testing of
applicantswithaviewtoadvisingthemofthekindofemploymenttowhichtheymight
be "naturally" fitted.ThisworkwaslargelyundertakenbyE. Farmer, MaySmith, and
B. Muscio on printing compositors, engineering workers, telegraphists, and
confectioneryemployees.48 Inthe lattercase, itwasdiscovered that thesize andshape
of the workers' hands largely determined productivity in a number of sweet-
production processes.49 Moreover, the principles of vocational selection could be
applied to improve supervisory and managerial personnel, the calibre ofwhich was
oftencriticized bythe Board: "Ifselection and training are needed anywhere, they are
needed formanagement".50
The commitment ofthe Board to improving methods ofwork andjob designs was
indicated bytheirearlyutilization oftimeandmotion studies. Theexplicitaimofsuch
studieswastoidentifyandmeasureobstaclestoeasyperformance oftheworktaskand
thus to reduce needless energy expenditure and consequently relieve the physical and
mental strain of work. C. S. Myers and E. Farmer were responsible for these
investigations at the Derwent Iron Foundry, an anonymous metal polishing
workshop, and Pascall's confectionery company, while S. Wyattundertook a number
45 B. Muscioand E. Farner, 'Threestudiesinvocational selection', IFRBReportNo. 16, 1922,pp. 66-67.
46 E. P. Cathcart, D. E. R. Hughes, andJ. G. Chambers, 'Thephysiqueofman inindustry', IHRBReport
No. 71, 1935; IHRB, Annual Report, 30 June 1935, pp. 15-16.
47 Daily Worker, 20 March 1934.
48 IFRB, AnnualReport, 30 September 1921, pp. 47-49. See Muscio and Farmer, op. cit., note45 above,
and M. Smith, M. Culpin, and E. Farmer, 'A study oftelegraphists' cramp', IFRB Report No. 43, 1927.
49 IFRB, Annual Report, 30 September 1921, pp. 48-9; Muscio and Farmer, op. cit., note 45 above,
pp. 85-86.
50 IHRB, Annual Report, 30 June 1936, p. 3.
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ofstudies in textile plants, and M. Smith an investigation oflaundries.5' The Board
laid great emphasis on the advantages to be derived from closely studying the labour
process, formulating a set ofthe mostefficient movements foreach task, rationalizing
the arrangement of tools and materials, studying the design of machinery, and
carefullytrainingworkersintheimprovedmethodsofdoingthejob.52Optimumloads
and the best working height ofthe bench were also calculated. The Board advocated
close union co-operation during any work measurement exercise and an equitable
wage incentive scheme; that is, one that did not incorporate an automatic price-
breaker, asthepremiumbonussystemdid.53 The latterwasparticularly dangerous for
weaker workers, who spurred themselves on, often into serious overstrain.54 As
Vernon argued, one ofthe most frequent causes ofexcessive fatigue in the 1920s was
the speeding-up tendencies ofunsuitable systems of remuneration.55
The potential for increased productivity with reduced energy expenditure and
improved health using such methods was clearly realized, and the IHRB postulated
thatifsuch scientific management methods were introduced in a fairandjust manner,
with the object ofimproving work methods and reducing energy expenditure, rather
than simply "speeding-up" work, then the benefits for both management and men
were enormous.56 The problem lay in the application of such concepts. The IHRB
investigators claimed never to have used the stop-watch to set "standard" times for
tasks, nor, as the efficiency engineers used them, with a view to necessarily increasing
output.57 Nevertheless, workers were particularly suspicious of this aspect of the
Board's work, regarding it as an unwarranted monitoring procedure, an interference
and a humiliation, and a first step to speeding up production.58 In fact, the Board
spoke out on a number of occasions against the intensifying pace of work which
characterized much of inter-war industry.
The Board developed, in conjunction with a number ofother organizations-most
prominent ofwhich was the National Institute of Industrial Psychology-a vitriolic
critique ofthe methods ofwhat they regarded as the "pseudo-scientific" American-
influenced managerial school, and advocated a peculiarly British brand of labour
management, more "humanized" and based firmly on the empirical findings of the
more purely scientific "fatigue studies" and industrial psychology investigations.59
Thecrucial point stressed by the IHRB was the great diversity ofhuman physical and
si C. S. Myers, 'A studyofimprovedmethods in an iron foundry', IFRBReport No. 3, 1919; E. Farmer,
'Motion study in metal polishing', IFRB Report No. 15, 1921; S. Wyatt, 'Variations in efficiency in cotton
weaving', IFRB Report No. 23, 1923; M. Smith, 'Some studies in the laundry trade', IFRB Report No. 22,
1922.
52 IHRB, Annual Report, 30 June 1935, pp. 15-16; 30 September 1921, p. 49.
53 Ibid., 30 June 1937, p. 3; E. Farmer, 'Time and motion study', IFRB Report No. 14, 1921, p. 20.
54 S. Wyatt, L. Frost, and F. G. L. Stock, 'Incentives in repetitive work', IHRB Report No. 69, 1934,
pp. 56-57.
55IFRB, Annual Report, 31 December 1924, pp. 56-57.
56 IHRB, Annual Report, 30 June 1938, p. 38.
57 Farmer, op. cit., note 53 above, p. 34.
58 IHRB, Annual Report, 30 June 1934, pp. 3-5. Many workers had a justified phobia about medical
examinations and output measurements, especially as they became older. It was widely rumoured that the
resultswouldgodownasablackmarkinaworker'sfileandbeusedagainst him orherlater,as anexcuse for
dismissal when work was slack. The spectre ofunemployment, above all, fuelled workers' suspicions and
prejudices. See J. E. Cronin, Labour andsociety in Britain, 1918-1979, London, Batsford, 1984, pp. 35-6.
170Manual work, technology, and industrial health 1918-39
mental capabilities and the considerable variety in different people's energy levels.60
Thiswasthebasisofitslabourmanagementphilosophy. Workersshouldpreferablybe
allowed tocontrol theirown speed ofworkandmakeadjustments to theirpace asand
when the chose: "The work ofthe human machine cannot be ticked out in seconds as
byaclock. Ithasrhythm, andtherhythmvaries-workhasitsupsanddowns-intune
to the pulse ofphysical and mental energy, which itselfrises and ebbs in accordance
with the physiological laws governing the functions of all living organisms."61 E.
Farmer argued that the question ofrhythm was all-important. Fatigue resulted when
effort norms wereexcessively increased because ofthe interference generated with the
natural rhythm of the body.62
As far as the labour process is concerned, it would be a fair generalization to state
that the trend in industry in the inter-war period with the shift in emphasis from the
older, declining staple industries, to the newer, more prosperous industries was
towardsmoremechanized, uniform, sub-divided, light,repetitiveworkwhichplaced a
premium on dexterity and mental capacity, rather than muscle. The Chief Medical
Inspector ofFactories noted in 1935: "Speed is the essence ofpresentdayindustry, as
exemplifiedintheconveyorsystem ...whereinasingleoperationisperformed,minute
inandminuteout,throughouttheworkingday. Itistooearlyyettojudgeoftheresults
ofthissystemonthehealthoftheworkerssoemployed, butsomeapprehensioncannot
but be felt as to its ultimate effects."63 The IHRBconsequently devoted itsenergies to
investigating the psychology of work, and particularly the problem of monotony,
producingawholeseriesofreportsincorporating theresults oftheirsurveysintolight,
repetitivework.64 Ingeneral, theyfoundthatefficiencywasseriously impairedbylack
ofjob satisfaction, resulting commonly in a loss of 10-30 per cent ofpotential output
and a decrease in the quality ofwork.65 As an antidote to monotonyefined as the
flagging ofmental energy, expressing itselfin a feeling ofapathy and lassitude-the
Board suggested specific changes in work design to increase interest, rotation ofthe
most simple tasks at intervals rather than specialization, psychological and
physiological selectionteststofindthemostsuitablepersonnel, shorterworkinghours,
more frequent rest pauses and breaks, and, finally, music piped into theworkplace.66
Piece-rate working was considered an essential incentive for repetitive work, though
Wyatt, Frost, and Stock found in 1934 that such payment systems could have adverse
side-effects(includingincreasedjealousy, strainedrelations, andirritability), especially
59 See, for example, Sir David Munro, secretary of the IHRB, 'Introduction to the 38th Oxford
Management Conference onOptimum Productivity in Modem Industry', British Management Review, III,
no. 3, July-September 1938, pp. 10-24.
60 E. Farmer, 'The practical uses oftime study', OxfordLecture Conferences, I October 1926, p. 11. See
also Smith, Culpin, and Farmer, op. cit., note 48 above; and Rose, op. cit., note 26 above, pp. 79-80.
61 IHRB, Annual Report, 30 June 1937, p. 3.
62 IFRB, Annual Report, 30 September 1921, p. 54.
63 Factory Inspector's Report, 1935, Cmd. 5230, p. 42, cited in N. Branson and M. Heinemann, Britain in
the nineteen thirties, St Albans, Panther, 1973, p. 95.
64 See, forexample, S. Wyatt and J. A. Fraser, 'The effects ofmonotony in work', IHRB Report No. 56,
1929;andS.WyattandJ. N. Langdon,'Fatigueandboredominrepetitivework', IHRBReportNo. 77, 1937.
65 IHRB, Annual Report, 30 June 1932, p. 20.
66 Ibid., pp. 21-22; 30 June 1938, pp. 24-26. See also C. S. Myers, 'Industrial overstrain and unrest' in
B. Muscio (editor), Lectures on industrial administration, London, Pitman, 1920, pp. 175-177, 181-182.
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affectingtheslowerandlesscapableoperatives.67 Inotherwords,incentivesprolonged
effort but at a cost: "At the same time it is often responsible for undesirable forms of
behaviour and may be the cause ofmuch unhappiness. It stimulates the selfish and
assertive tendencies in human nature and while the more capable workers find this
pleasantandsatisfying, thosewho arelesswellendowedmaybecomediscouragedand
depressed."68
The emphasis in the Board's work shifted in the 1930s to an analysis ofa range of
psychological problems related to work and, through their links with the MRC, the
Board made a number ofinquiries into specific medical problems ofhealth at work.
A. B. Hill's cardroom dust and respiratory diseases investigation falls into this
category.69 He also undertook two other statistical inquiries into the incidence of
tuberculosis in the printing trade and the excessive prevalence of gastric sickness
amongst bus-drivers.70 In the late 1930s, the IHRB was also involved in two other
related research projects; the effects of inhaling toxic industrial solvents and
psycho-neurosis in industry.7'
One ofthe Board's significant failures, however, was their inability to perfect any
reliable psychological or physiological test to determine and precisely to measure
industrial fatigue. Immediately prior to and during World War I, a number of
industrial health investigators (including A. F. Stanley Kent) had felt confident that
using a number ofgadgets to test strength, dexterity, mental alertness, reflexes, blood
pressure, and pulse rate, an adequate scientific test to indicate fatigue could be
formulated. Such tests, at least in theirearly unsophisticated form, were all described
by B. A. McSwiney (lecturer in applied physiology, Leeds University), B. Muscio
(IHRB investigator), and a number of other researchers who were increasingly
experiencingdifficultiesusing suchtechniques.72 Themainproblem, asMuscionoted,
was the impossibility ofeliminating curiosity, emotion, and will in the subject being
tested.73
As a result, the Board fell back on the use of indirect measurements of fatigue,
particularly concentrating throughout the 1920s and 1930s on the use of an output
norm orperformance test as a retrospective indicator offatigue.74 Other indices were
used ascorroborating evidence, including time lost, sickness, accident, mortality, and
labourturnoverrates. Theuseoftheoutputtestwasconsideredmostsatisfactorybutit
did result in some limitation ofthe Board's research work. Such a test could only be
appliedtouniformproductionprocesseswhereoutputwasrelativelystandardizedand
67 Wyatt, FrostandStock, op.cit., note 54above, p. 57. Seealso Lewenhak, 1977,op. cit., note21 above,
pp. 212-213.
68 Wyatt, Frost, and Stock, op. cit., note 54 above, p. 49.
69 Hill, 1930, op. cit., note 44 above.
70 A. B. Hill, 'An investigation into the sickness experience ofprinters', IHRB Report No. 54, 1929; 'An
investigation into the sickness experience ofLondon Transport workers', IHRB Report No. 79, 1937. For
Bevin'scritical comments onthedelay (1928-37) regarding thelatter report see E. Bevin, Thejob tobedone,
London, Heinemann, 1942, p. 169.
71 IHRB, Annual Report, 30 June 1938, pp. 31-34, 38.
72 Letter, B. A. McSwiney to IFRB, 27 January 1920, MRC Archives, 2080; B. Muscio, 'Is a fatigue test
possible?', Br. J. Psychol., 1921, no. 10, part 1.
73 IFRB, Annual Report, 31 March 1920, pp. 13, 18-21.
74 Munro, op. cit., note 59 above, p. 6.
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thuscould bepreciselymeasured-asinweaving orinshell-making. Thesensitivity of
theoutputtestforfatiguedependedalso onthenatureoftheworkandparticularly the
extent to which the human factorplayed a part in theproduction process. Obviously,
in predominantly automatic processes, output changes are an unsuitable test for
human fatigue. Moreover, much care had to be exercised on the part of the
investigators toeliminateotherfactorsthatmightberesponsibleforoutputvariations,
including forms of incentive, technical adjustments, and material flows, and the
deliberate output restriction or improvement by workers who might have a vested
interestinslantingtheresultsoftheexperimentonewayortheother.Thereportsofthe
Board indicate that its investigators were acutely aware ofsuch pitfalls, and that they
went to considerable lengths to eliminate, or at least make allowances for, all other
possible factors influencing output performance.
III
How far did the IHRB succeed in getting across to British industry its message that
industrial medicine pays? Did its influence, in conjunction with the thrust of
technologicalchange, rationalization ofthelabourprocess, andrelateddevelopments,
result in an improvement in industrial health during the inter-war years? These are
difficult questions to address and our conclusions are necessarily tentative, partly
because vital evidence is lacking and partly because of the difficulties involved in
disentangling ideology from actual workshop practice.75 It was one thing to express
interest in innovative labour management ideas, quite another to implement such a
system on the shop floor. As Paul Weindling has recently commented: "The gap
betweenawarenessofhazardsandeffectiveactiontoeliminatethedangerisarecurrent
feature of the history of occupational health".76
There were a number ofmechanisms by which the work of the IHRB percolated
through to industry. Its findings were marketed in the form of highly technical,
academic research monographs through HMSO, and its researchers also used the
medical and growing labour management press to present their arguments and
hypotheses. However, anumberofindependentorganizationswerelargelyresponsible
for the practical diffusion of the "fatigue studies" ideology. Here, the National
Institute of Industrial Psychology (NIIP) was an important link. The NIIP was
established by the pre-eminent industrial psychologist in inter-war Britain, Charles
Myers, who left his post as director ofthe Psychology Laboratory at Cambridge to
head the new institute. The NIIP was established as a commercial enterprise in 1921,
funded by private fees and contributions, to provide a consultancy service for firms
interested inimprovingproductivity.77 Myerswascritical oftheAmerican "efficiency
75Thelack ofregularworkplacemedical inspection in the 1920sand 1930smeans that thereis noway of
analysing statistically the precise impact of occupation on health. See Factory Inspector's Reports, 1933,
Cmd. 4657, p.49; 1934, Cmd. 4931, p. 51; 1936, Cmd. 5514, p.42. Therearealsoproblemsusingthe Factory
Inspector'saggregated statisticsonaccidents, poisoning,etc.,asthebasisfordatacollectionwascontinually
changing and improving, and the fluctuating numbers employed or partially employed in the depression
years makes year-by-year comparisons most unreliable.
76 Weindling, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 16.
77 IFRB. AnnualReport, 31 December 1924, p. 22; Report on ProposedRelations Between the IFRBand
the NIIP, 29 November 1920, MRC Archives, File No. 2080; Manchester Guardian, 28 March 1922, p. 8.
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engineering" approach to labour management and of employer-initiated welfare
schemes, such as that operating at ICI.78 He advocated the application of
psychological investigation and knowledge to the problems ofindustry and industrial
relations, this to be done with the fullest consultation of the workers themselves.79
Though they had their differences, relations between the IHRB and the NIIP were
close throughout the 1920s and 1930s, and the Institute played a significant, if not
crucial, role indisseminating the ideas ofthe Board.80 Myers was both a member ofthe
Board and the director ofthe NIIP in the 1920s and '30s. Arrangements were made by
the Board in 1921 forcomplete co-operation and free interchange ofinvestigators with
the Institute.81 This arrangement worked well to provide Board investigators with
fieldwork experience in individual factories, and Institute researchers with laboratory
facilities, and thus to provide the closest intimacy between pure and applied research.
The Board advertised the services ofthe NIIPin its reports and monographs, whilst the
Quarterly Journal of the NIIP provided a forum for a precis of the Board's research
findings and ongoing work, often with some discussion of the possible practical
applications.82 Moreover, the debt ofthe Institute to the pure research undertaken by
theBoardwasrecognized by Myersandwas indicatedclearlyinanumber ofthe NIIP's
publications. Inacollection ofarticles byNIIP researchers edited by Myers in 1929, for
example, forty per cent of the references cited in the bibliography were IHRB or
HMWC publications.83 The Institute continued to develop through the 1920s and
1930s and was responsible for the practical dissemination of the Fatigue Board's
findings as well as encouraging the idea of scientific-based experimentation into
industrial efficiency andhealth.84 As the Board recognized: "Itconducts forindividual
firmspracticalinvestigations into thewayinwhichhuman energy isbeing used, such as
time and motion studies, routing and lay-out investigations, surveys ofhours ofwork
and of environmental factors such as heating, lighting and ventilation etc., and by
doing so is enabled to recommend in practice the adoption ofmeasures based notonly
on the results ofits own investigations, but on the more general results ofthe research
work of the Board."85
Some representation was also sought by the IHRB at a number ofconferences and
seminars, though it certainly did not seek a high profile. Hence, Sir David Munro's
introductory address to the 38th Oxford Management Conference on Optimum
Productivity in Modem Industryin 1938 wascommented on asarareappearance (and
a great privilege!) by the IHRB secretary. Munro proceeded with avituperative attack
78C. S. Myers (editor), Industrial psychology, London, Thornton Butterworth, 1929, pp. 10-11;
C. S. Myers, Mind and work, London, University ofLondon Press, 1920, passim; L. Urwick and E. F. L.
Brech, Themakingofscientific management, London, Management Publications Trust, 1946, vol. 2, p. 223.
79G. Brown, Sabotage, Nottingham, Spokesman, 1977, p. 214; W. Raphael, 'The contribution of
industrial psychology to personnel work', British Management Review, II, No. 2, April-June 1937.
80 IHRB, Annual Report, 30 June 1936, p. 31.
81 IFRB, Annual Report, 31 September 1921, p. 13.
82 Publications Department, MRCArchives, FileNo. 11 1,27June 1922; IHRB, AnnualReport, 30June
1932, p. 45.
83 Myers (editor), op. cit., note 78 above, pp. 245-249.
84 Foradetailed analysisofthehistory oftheNIIPseeD. C. Doyle, 'The history ofindustrial psychology
in Britain: the NIIP, 1921-39', Manchester University, PhD thesis, 1979.
85 IHRB, Annual Report, 30 June 1932, p. 45.
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on the efficiency engineers' labour management techniques. The more enlightened
participants of the Oxford Management Conferences organized by Rowntree had
almost certainly read many ofthe Board's monographs and registered a continuing
interest in its work.86 Moreover, the reports of such conferences indicate that the
questions offatigue, industrial health, and energy expenditure at work were often on
the agenda.
The work ofthe Board also found a place in the discussions of the Management
Research Groups (MRGs) in the late 1920s and the 1930s, and Harry Ward, the
secretary ofGroup No. 1, receivedcopies ofthe Board's research monographs.87 The
MRGs were established in 1927 and were the inspiration of B. S. Rowntree, with
C. G. Renold and L. Urwick beingprominent in themovement initsearlydays.88The
ideawas toestablish anumberofgroups "topromotetheefficiencyofmanagementin
commerce and industry through the encouragement of the study of management
problems, the exchange of experience between firms and organisations, and the
provisionofinformation".89 MRG 1 consisted ofanumberofthelargestcompaniesin
Britain. MRG2combinedcompaniesemploying between 500-2,000, andanumberof
other MRGs (eight in 1929) combined companies in relatively close geographical
proximity in the main industrial regions. Total membership in 1929 was ninety firms,
including, in MRG 1, such industry leaders as the Austin Motor Company, Dunlop
Rubber, Imperial Tobacco, Lever Brothers, Rowntree & Co., English Electric Co.,
Bradford Dyers Association, J. & J. Colman, Pilkington Brothers, and Wolsey Ltd.
Amongst abroadrangeoftopics, MRG 1 discussedtheBedauxsystem, fatigue, and
restpausesintheearly 1930s. WhilstC.Walton, ofLever,expressedextremesuspicion
of organized rest pauses, the consensus was that well-organized spells of work,
punctuated with periodic rest and refreshment periods, preferably combined with
some change ofposture and movement, gave the best physiological effects, reduced
industrial fatigue, and resulted in enhanced output at no adverse cost to the workers'
health.90 This indicates that some of the crucial tenets of IHRB ideology were
beginningtopenetratethemindsofanumberofenlightenedindustryleaders. Whether
such practices were widespread on the shop floor in such firms is another matter.
Regrettably, MRG 1 did not undertake a systematic survey of work spells and rest
pauses amongst its member firms.
The British Science Guild (BSG) also played a part in disseminating the research
work of the IHRB in the 1920s and 1930s. The BSG was founded by Sir Norman
Lockyer in 1905 and composed a membership of around 930 individuals in 1920,
mostly academics andenlightenedindustrialists.91 In theinter-waryears, anumberof
IHRB and ex-HMWC staff had links with the Guild, including W. Fletcher,
C. Sherrington,C. S. Myers, T. Barlow,andL. Hill. Itsmainfunctionwas"toconvince
86 Munro, op. cit., note 59 above, p. 12.
87Management Research Groups (MRGs) Archive, Business History Unit, London School of
Economics, File No. W/P/38. Seealso S. P. Keeble, 'Management Research Groups', Business Archives, 47,
November 1981.
88 MRGs, First Annual Report, 1 January to 31 December 1927, p. 1.
89 MRGs, Constitution, January 1933, p. 1.
90 MRG No. 1, Minutes ofthe Labour Section, 3 March 1932.
91 British Science Guild, Journal, no. 10, January 1920, p. 2.
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the nation of the necessity of applying methods of science to all branches of human
endeavour, and thus to further the progress and increase the wealth ofthe Empire."92
It developed into a pressure group promoting public awareness about the connexions
between science and industry, agitating for improved educational facilities and
increasedfinancial support-stateandprivate-for scientific research and generally to
improvethe status ofscience and the utilization ofscientific methods in the running of
the country.93 This included the promotion of scientific methods of labour
management and particularly the implementation ofthe research work of the Board
andtheNIIP.94TheGuildthuschampioned vocational selection and training, motion
study, fatigue studies, rest pauses, experimentation with work spells, and improved
machinery design. It also encouraged a drastic shake-up in British management to
achieve theinputofmen ofscientific background and training. The practical impact of
theGuild'swork,however, isdifficultto assess, andin 1936itwas finallyabsorbed into
the British Association for the Advancement of Science.95
Anumberoforganizations and groups concerned specificallywith industrial health
andwelfarealso played apartindigesting and disseminating the results ofthe IHRB's
research. Welfare and medical officers employed in firms provided an important link
between research and practical application, as did the Factory Inspectorate. On a
smaller scale, the Industrial Welfare Society (IWS) performed a similar role to the
NIIP,in sofarastheygavecoverage toIHRB findingsintheirjournal and based many
oftheir"practical plans forwelfare work" whichwent beyond statutory requirements
ontheworkand findings ofthe Board in this field.96 The IWS was founded in 1918 by
R. R. Hyde, oneofB. S. Rowntree'sstafflattheWelfare Department oftheMinistry of
Munitions. Hyde was director of the Society throughout the inter-war period.97
ContactsbetweentheSocietyandtheBoardwerecloseandcordial, withcontributions
from the Board being published in the journal of the IWS, Industrial Welfare and
Personnel Management.98 The Industrial Health Education Council and the New
Health Society did much to expose the considerable losses of industrial efficiency
caused by preventable occupational diseases, malnutrition, accidents, poor hygiene,
and general personal health.99 This was where the borderline between scientific
management and the "national efficiency" movements became obscured and
fragmented into numerous, often ephemeral but good-intentioned organizations.
Finally, it might be noted that the spread ofpsychology and physiology teaching in
colleges and universities played its part in accelerating the diffusion of the Board's
findings. Indeed, as the Board's reports were deliberately designed as scientific
92Ibid., no. 1, September 1915, p. 2.
93 Ibid., Second Annual Report, 15 January 1908, p. 5; Journal, no. 21, March 1926, p. 21.
94 Ibid., Journal, no. 17, February 1924, pp. 31-32; Journal, no. 18, June 1924, p. 27.
95The extensive archives ofthe British Science Guild, housed at the Bodleian Library, Oxford, deserve
much more detailed analysis.
96 IHRB, Annual Report, 30 June 1932, pp. 46-47.
97 For a briefdiscussion ofthe broader role ofthe Industrial Welfare Society see H. Jones, 'Employers'
welfare schemes and industrial relations in inter-war Britain', Business History, 25: 1983, 67-68.
98 Letter, IWS to IHRB, 20 October 1939; Letter, IHRB to IWS, 26October 1939, MRC Archives, File
No. 2080/21.
99 TheIndustrial Health Educational Council, Confederation ofBritish Industries, PredecessorArchive,
Modern Records Centre, Warwick University, MSS 200/B/3/2/c692 part 3.
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research monographs open to academic scrutiny and criticism, this was probably the
level atwhich themostextensive degree ofcomprehension oftheirfindings tookplace
(somemightarguetheonlylevel?). Certainly, nearlyallofthepermanentinvestigating
staff of the IHRB in the 1930s held academic posts: for example, E. Farmer was a
readerinindustrialpsychologyatCambridgeUniversity; S.Wyattwasalecturerinthe
department ofpsychology at Manchester University; T. Bedford was a lecturer in the
department ofindustrial physiology at the London School ofHygiene and Tropical
Medicine; and M. Culpin held the chair in industrial medical psychology at the
University ofLondon.100Thismodeofdiffusionwasseverelylimited, however, bythe
very tenuous links that existed in the inter-war years between academe and industry.
In sum, the results ofthe IHRB'sworkwere percolatingthrough to industryfrom a
number of sources, and some significant successes indicate at least a degree of
penetration oftheindustrialpsychologyandfatigue studiesideology totheworkplace
in the 1930s. Clearly, many of the largest firms, especially those in the expanding,
newer sector ofthe economy, which often enjoyed a protected market position, were
awareofitsworkandhadadoptedsomechangesinlabourmanagementinlinewithits
research.'0' The formation ofthe NIIP and the continuation and development ofits
work in the 1920s and 1930s reflects industry's increased interest in industrial
psychology and fatigue studies. Moreover, from the mid-1930s, a number of
government departments were officially recognizing the science of vocational
psychology asanaid totherecruitment andselection ofadolescents forparticularjobs
and occupations, and the Army Council adopted psychological selection tests for
recruits.102 The idea ofmusic beingpiped intotheworkplace to relieve monotony was
accepted byanumberofemployers, and thedemandwas suchthatthe BBCproduced
the 'Music While You Work' programmes in the late 1930s. Theconsolidation ofthe
1918-19 reduction in working hours (to around 47-8 per week for the majority of
British workers) over the 1920s and 1930s, and the Holidays with Pay legislation of
1938-9, also undoubtedly owed something to the Board's propaganda that excessive
working hours were uneconomical as well as unhealthy. The 1937 Factory Act,
moreover, incorporated the results ofIHRB work into the value ofshort rest pauses,
guidelines onweight-carrying, and theuse ofspecial spectacles forfine, closework.103
It also legalized the 48-hour working week as a maximum, reduced permissible
overtime tosixhoursperweek,madetheprovision ofwashing,cloakroom,andseating
facilities compulsory in all factories, and included provisions empowering the
Secretary of State to enforce regular medical inspection of workers where he had
reason to believe that illness might be due to the nature of the work.104 This
significantly extended the 1901 Act and the role ofpreventive medicine in industry,
thus raising basic standards ofhealth, safety, and welfare.
The point should clearly be made, however, that it was predominantly the
expanding, relatively prosperous, modern sector ofthe economy, based largely in the
'o IHRB, Annual Report, 30 June 1935, pp. 8-9.
10 Ibid., 30 June 1933, p. 26; 30 June 1937, pp. 26-27; 30 June 1939, p. 22.
102 Ibid., 30 June 1935, p. 27.
103 IHRB, Annual Report, 30 June 1938, p. 59.
'04 Factory Inspector's Reports, 1937, Cmd. 5802, pp. 5-7, 52, 73; 1938, Cd. 6081, pp. 87, 92. See also
HMSO, A guide to the Factories Act, 1937.
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Midlands, South and South-East of England-including electricity, electrical goods,
motor-car manufacture, food-processing, aircraft, chemicals, plastics, artificial
fibres-that registered the most positive response to new ideas relating to industrial
health and efficiency. Working conditions varied considerably, therefore
generalizations are difficult. Yet it was amongst these industries that industrial health
wasqualitatively improvingin theinter-war period.105 Thenew factories embodied the
latest innovations in design and construction and were generally much better
illuminated (large windows and use of the sodium discharge lamp), heated, and
ventilated, were safer(forexample, in terms ofaccess to fireescapes), and had the most
up-to-date sanitary arrangements.'06 As D. R. Wilson, the Chief Factory Inspector,
noted in 1937 in discussing the advantages inherent in migration to the South for
employment: "Another advantage gained by such transfers is that light and airy
modem, single-storey factories, scientifically planned to economise labour, and
situated in open and healthy surroundings, take the place of the old, many storeyed
buildings with their restricted supply of fresh air and daylight. Work is consequently
carried on under far more advantageous conditions both as regards the health ofthe
workers and economy of labour and overhead charges."'107 Moreover, some
progressive employers also introduced regular medical inspection and welfare
facilities, 1,800 welfare officers and around 1,500 nurses being employed full-time in
industry in 1939.108 Motives for the introduction ofsuch facilities were only partially
altruistic. Medical care was considered by many to be a paying proposition, designed
specifically to increase the overall efficiency, and hence profit margin, ofthe plant.'09
Theutilization ofelectricity asapowersource in thesenew factories and its spread to
some older plants, facilitated by the completion of the National Grid in 1933,
considerably enhanced and improved healthy working conditions. One result was the
implementation of much more efficient lighting systems-particularly noticeable in
factories located in rural districts-utilizing sodium discharge and mercury vapour
discharge lamps.110Thenoiselevels ofolder, mechanical transmission driving was also
much reduced with electricity, and this facilitated the introduction ofthe wireless into
factories in the later 1930s.'1l Moreover, the use ofelectricity as a prime mover meant
not only much more flexibility and efficiency in power transmission, but also the
elimination ofthe chaos ofdrive belts, shafts, pulleys, and gears, which characterized
thenineteenth-century steam-poweredworkshop andmill, andwhich were thecause of
innumerable accidents, many fatal.112 Electric drive also enabled emergency stop-
105 Branson and Heinemann, op. cit., note 63 above, p. 88.
106 Factory Inspector's Report, 1933, Cmd. 4657, pp. 13-14, 49.
107 Ibid., 1937, Cmd. 5802, p. 13.
108 S. Pollard, The development ofthe British economy, 1914-1967, 2nd ed., London, Edward Arnold,
1969, p. 346; J. Stevenson, British Society 1914-45, Harmondsworth, Middx., Penguin, 1984, p. 191. The
employment offactory doctors, however, was still negligible. Only thirty-five full-time and around twice as
many part-time doctors were employed in industry in 1939.
1 Factory Inspector's Report, 1939, Cmd. 6251, pp. 35-36.
110 Ibid., 1938, Cmd. 6081, p. 27.
' Ibid., 1934, Cmd. 4931, pp. 26-27; 1938, Cmd. 6081, p. 96.
112 D. Landes, The unbound Prometheus: technological change and industrial development in Western
Europeftom 1750tothepresent, Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 288; BransonandHeinemann, op. cit.,
note 63 above, pp. 88-89; Factory Inspector's Report, 1935, Cmd. 5230, pp. 5, 24-25.
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motion devices to be installed much more cheaply and easily at every machine, or at
least in every room.113 The importance of the latter in accident prevention was
recognizedwhenitwasmadecompulsory fromJuly 1938 underthe 1937 Factories Act.
Whilst the newer, relatively prosperous industries provided, in general, a much
healthier working environment, there were a number of negative aspects, arguably
detrimental tothe health andwell-being ofemployees. Greaterdistances from home to
workoftenaddedconsiderably to theworkingday. New technology andnewmaterials
replaced old health hazards with new ones. Skin cancers and dermatitis, for example,
increased with the expansion in petrochemicals and plastics industries, whilst death
and injury through electric shock partially, at least, compensated for the reduced
accident rate registered on transmission machinery.'14 This was partly a problem of
ignorance ofelementary technical principles ofelectricity, most ofthe worst accidents
being to unskilled men. Glare produced by improper positioning and inadequate
screening ofnew electric lighting systems was found to be a frequent source ofworker
fatigue and eye-strain by the Factory Inspectorate, who were also aware that new
machinerycreatednovel, unknown risks, especially through thepotential foraccidents
in regard to unfenced moving parts.115
Moreover, it was in the newer, expanding sector of industry where the most
far-reachingchangesweretakingplace intheorganization ofworkandre-design ofthe
labourprocess. The tendency, as already noted, was towards work ofa lighter and less
skilled character, with tasks minutely sub-divided on the basis of crude flow
production-epitomized by the Henry Ford-inspired conveyor-belt organization of
motor-car manufacture. Such work produced, as the IHRB and the Factory
Inspectorate testified, new problems ofmonotony at work linked with intangible and
unquantifiable indications of mental stress, anxiety, and nervous tension. The
comments of J. C. Bridge, Senior Medical Inspector of Factories, in 1931 are worth
citing in some length:
It is true that the pleasure ofthe craftsman is being crushed by the steady increase in mechanised
processes, the result of which is seen in the tendency to rise of sickness rates for 'nervous
disabilities' .... Repetition processes undoubtedly create a weariness not expressed in physical
termsbutinadesire bytheworkerfortemporary relieffromtheenforced boredomofoccupation
in which the mind is left partially or entirely unoccupied. This fact must be recognised for the
understandingofsicknessrecordsand absenteeism intheindustrial population. Vastlymoredays
are lost from vague, ill-defined, but no doubt very real, disability due to ennui than from all the
recognised industrial diseases together. How this state ofaffairs is to be controlled is a pressing
problem ofindustrial health at this time. Moreinterest inprocesses thatare themselves dullmust
becreated. Selection ofworkers is in this problem only oflimited value; there aremoredull tasks
than people suitable for them. Industrial management may solve the difficulty-piece for time
rates, a system ofpromotion on efficiency, bonuses ofholidays for unbroken time-keeping, rest
pauses with achange ofposture and attention, are but a few suggestions in a problem which is a
growingone. Theuninterested workeris an industrial invalid. Interestinwork leads to industrial
good health.116
113 Ibid., 1938, pp. 32-33.
114 Ibid., 1935, Cmd. 5230, pp. 54-55; 1938, Cmd. 6081, pp. 50-52.
111 Ibid., 1934, Cmd. 4931, p. 26; 1936, Cmd. 5514, p. 8.
116 Ibid., 1931,Cmd.4098,p.75. Seealso 1936,Cmd. 5514,pp.42-43.Aninterestingaccountofthehealth
problemscreated byalightengineering firm in Milanmuch influenced byscientificmanagement methodsis
provided by P. Willson, 'The golden factory', in Weindling, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 252.
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Women in particular suffered from mental exhaustion at work, and causal factors
might be highlighted. The first is external to the workplace and reminds us that it is
impossible to analyse health at work in a vacuum, for factors outside the workplace-
housing, nutrition, family life-crucially affected health, and even the Senior Medical
InspectorofFactories acceptedthatonbalance "itis outside the factorywhere most of
theill-healtharises".117 Therootcauseoffatigue amongst working women lay in their
dualroleasworker/housewife andchild-rearer. Thesecond factoristheverycharacter
ofwomen's work, their participation in the labour market being restricted largely to
the least skilled, least responsible, and most degraded of occupations."18 Whilst
accepting that many employers provided good working conditions for women and
arguing, somewhat obtusely, that women were somehow intrinsically more adaptable
to boring, repetitive work, Sibyl Horner, a Medical Inspector ofFactories, went on to
comment:
Thereis, however, anadverse sideto industrial life forwomen, and this isevident to any observer
who has the opportunity ofstudying women at work. They age quickly, their apparent age is the
elder sister to their baptismal certificates. Physical attraction is early attained and quickly lost.
But so it is with every group ofwomen workers-these facts are not confined to women factory
workers. The reason is, I think, this: women's work often begins when it nominally ends. The
house anddependents make theirclaims on thewoman worker. Her work is never done. She has,
with the possible exception of the unmarried girl, fewer recreations or relaxations than her
contemporary male.119
It was in the older, depressed, staple sectors of the economy-including textiles,
coal, iron and steel, and shipbuilding-that industrial health standards stagnated in
the inter-war years and absorption of innovatory "scientific" ideas on the
physiological and psychological conditions conducive to industrial efficiency and
worker health was extremely limited. Significantly, most ofthe IHRB initiatives were
directedatidentifyingandexposinghealthandfatigueproblemsintheseindustriesand
prescribing preventive measures. Moreover, the Factory Inspectorate singled out the
stapleindustries asproviding the least healthyworking environment, the result partly
of older factory architecture, design, space allocation, technology, habits, and
attitudes.'20 L. Bryderand G. Burke have also recently suggested thatin twodeclining
sectors, slate-quarryinginN.Walesandmetal-mininginCornwall, standards ofhealth
at work deteriorated between 1900 and 1939.121 Workers' health in the "basic
industries" was furtherundermined by two related factors; first, the mental strain and
tension ofrecurrent short-time working, unemployment, and redundancy; second, by
117 Factory Inspector's Report, 1934, Cmd. 4931, p. 51.
118 B. Drake, Women in trade unions (1920), reprinted London, Virago Press, 1984, part III, section 1,
'Womens'placeinindustry',pp. 189-197; M.Philips, 'Womeninindustry', Ruskin College Reorganisation of
Industry Series, II, 1917, pp. 36-49; Cronin, op. cit., note 58 above, p. 67.
119 Factory Inspector's Report, 1933, Cmd. 4657, pp. 50-51.
120 Ibid., p. 41.
121 G. Burke, 'Disease, labour migration and technological change: the case of the Cornish miners', in
Weindling, op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 78-88. L. Bryder, 'Tuberculosis, silicosis, and the slate industry in N.
Wales, 1927-1939', ibid., pp. 108-126. In Cornwall, lack ofproper sanitary provisions led to outbreaks of
ankylostomiasis (a type of intestinal worm) in conjunction with the more frequent occurrence of lung
disease. See Burke, op. cit., pp. 83-85.
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theintensifiedworkload, "speeded-up" workpace, andincreaseddirectdisciplinethat
generally characterized the shop floor in these years. This is impossible to quantify or
assess precisely. Nevertheless, in this sense those in work as well as thoseunemployed
in theso-called "Depressed Areas" suffered adeterioration in standards ofhealth and
welfare.
Improvinghealthandwelfarewasanexpensivepropositionopenonlytothosefirms
showing regular profits and to industry leaders enjoying a relatively protected and
buoyantmarketposition. Quitetheoppositeeconomicscenarioconfrontedemployers
in the depressed staple sectors, most ofwhom lacked the financial resources to make
voluntary improvements in working conditions. Such firms were wary, moreover, of
increasing costs which might not be matched by their competitors, thus conferring a
crucial disadvantage in a cut-throat market place. Consequently, the employment of
factory welfare officers, nurses, dentists, and doctors was often considered an
extravagance, and capital was frequently not available for electrification, lighting
renewals, and technological improvement. Two examples help toillustrate this.
First,theBumleyWeavers'Associationcomplainedin 1935thatartificiallightingin
the town's cotton-weaving sheds was so poor that it resulted in serious eyestrain and
fatigue. The Factory Inspectorate confirmed this finding by an examination of
illumination ineightsheds.122Twoyearslater, itwasreportedthattherehadbeenlittle
improvement and that wool and cotton employers took almost no interest in efficient
industrial lighting, despite itsimportance asa sourceofsignificantproductivitylosses.
As the Chief Factory Inspector noted; "The subject is, however, difficult, and needs
expert technical consideration of spacing, intensity and dispersion and few of the
cotton manufacturing firms can at present afford the expert survey and the cost ofa
reorganised and re-arranged lighting system."123 Consequently, poor lighting
arrangements added to the discomfort of working in weaving-sheds artificially
steamed to raise humidity and to prevent frequent breakages ofheavily sized, inferior
yarns andtheriskofcontractingbyssinosis ("weaver'scough") from "shuttlekissing"
(sucking the yarn through the shuttle).'24
Second, thecottonspinning-mulewasresponsibleforaskincancer(epitheliomatous
ulceration) which was described by 1933 as "now the most menacing of all the
industrial diseases that are notifiable".'25 This usually affected the scrotum, and was
caused by the use ofcarcinogenic mineral oil as a lubricant on the spindles, which
splashed on to the clothing ofthe mule-spinners and piecers. From 1923 to 1936, 918
cases were reported, 305 ofwhich resulted in deaths, often ghastly and excruciatingly
painful.'26 The obvious preventive measure, periodical medical examination, was
rejected by employers on the grounds of cost and custom, and little capital was
available tomake the switch to thealternative, lessrisky spinningtechnology, thering
frame. Long overdue, a simple anti-splash device (whereby the spindle was lubricated
122 Factory Inspector's Report, 1935, Cmd. 5230, pp. 20-21.
123 Factory Inspector's Report, 1937, Cmd. 5802, p. 24. See also 1936, Cmd. 5514, p. 18.
124 A. Bullen, The Lancashire Weavers' Union, Manchester Free Press, 1984, p. 21.
125 Ibid., 1933, Cmd. 4657, pp. 9-10. See also H. A. Waldron, 'A briefhistory ofscrotal cancer', Br. J.
indus. Med., 1983, 40: 390-401.
126Factory Inspector's Report, 1936, Cmd. 5514, p. 48.
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bycontactwithanoil-soakedpad)wasfirstutilizedbyalargespinningfirmin 1938.127
Significantly, however, neither the addition of this device, nor provision for regular
medical supervision was incorporated in the 1937 Factories Act.
TheIHRBwerethemselvesbitterlydisappointed, tothepointofexasperation,atthe
very poor response of British management, the negligible diffusion oftheir findings,
and the relatively insignificant practical application of their research into industrial
health and efficiency on the shop floor in the 1930s. As the Board noted in 1934:
"Neglect ofphysiological principles at work is not far to seek. It is plain to the eye, in
everyvarietyofoccupation, thatmanis often put ata physical disadvantagein theuse
ofthe tools and machines ofhistrade."'128 R. T. Medd, a prominent NIIP researcher,
addedweight totheBoard'sviewswhen henotedin 1938 thattheindustrial worldwas
makingnoactiveeffortstoimplementthe Board's researchwork.129 Furthermore, the
initial experience of the war, 1939-40, added fuel to this pessimistic indictment of
British industry.
TheSecondWorldWarprovided acrucial testofwhethertheworkoftheindustrial
psychologists and the fatigue studies experts which emerged out ofthe 1914-18 war
hadbeenabsorbedbyBritishindustry. TheBoardwasclearlyawareofthedangersand
published in the early part of 1940 the first ofits 'Emergency Reports', summarizing
previous research findings in simple, non-technical fashion.'30 The response was
negative and a large section ofindustry stumbled into the same kind ofmistakes that
were made in 1914-15. After the disaster of Dunkirk in June 1940, the upsurge in
patrioticfervourandtheperceptionofthepossibilityofinvasionresultedinexcessively
lengthening working hours as industry responded to the call for an acceleration in
munitions manufacture and the replacement of equipment left on the French
beaches.'3' Ironically, this was encouraged by Ernest Bevin, Minister ofLabour, an
ex-member ofthe IHRBin the 1930s. Thiswas arepeatofthescenario of1915 and the
"shell scandal"-with similar repercussions. Work was considerably speeded-up,
workinghoursrose(commonly to70-75hoursperweek),holidayswerecancelled, and
Sunday working implemented. The initial rise in output could not be sustained,
however, as the ill-effects of accumulating fatigue manifested itself in increased
sickness rates, absenteeism, and a declining capacity to perform normal work tasks
adequately. Theanalogyofaforcedsprintduringtheearlypartofamarathonracewas
againreferredtobytheBoard, theFactoryInspectorate, andtheMRC, wholamented
that the work of the Board since 1918 on the physiological and psychological
conditions most conducive to optimum efficiency had been largely ignored: "It is
regrettable that but little was known about this work either by many industry leaders
or by the mass ofworkmen in the early stages ofthe war. Had this information been
morewidelyappreciated itmight havebeenpossible toavoidtheintroduction ofthose
excessively strenuous working conditions in the period immediately following the
127 Ibid., 1938, Cmd. 6081. p. 72.
128 IHRB, Annual Report, 30 June 1934, p. 24.
129 Munro, op. cit., note 59 above, discussion, p. 20.
130IHRB Emergency Report No. 1, 'Industrial health in war', London, HMSO, March 1940.
131 Committee ofthe Privy Council for Medical Research, 'Medical research in war: report ofthe MRC
for the years 1939-45', London, HMSO, December 1947, Cmd. 7335, p. 153; Factory Inspector's Reports,
1939, Cmd. 6251, p. 19; 1940, Cmd. 6316, pp. 3, 18-19.
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evacuation from Dunkirk which proved incompatible with a large sustained output
from the factories and with a good standard of health among the workpeople."'132
Therefore, whilstrationalizing labourmanagement techniquesweregainingground
in the inter-war years, especially amongst the newer firms in the expanding sector,
evidence nonetheless suggests that a large proportion ofBritish industrycontinued to
lack any positive attitude towardsexperimentation, workmeasurement, and scientific
analysis ofthe workplace. Why was this? How can the relative failure of the IHRB
pre-1939 to push forward the parameters of industrial health and efficiency be
explained? It will be argued that the interaction ofthree major factors are primarily
responsible; marketing constraints, financial cost, and management receptivity.
InmarkedcontrasttotheBedauxconsultants,theIHRBfailedtomarketitsproduct
well. The Board admitted in 1932 that the most difficult part of its work was the
publicizing of its research results and ensuring their application in industry.133 The
mainvehicleforthedisseminationoftheBoard'sresearchwasitsAnnual Reportsand
lengthy research monographs. These were solid, detailed pieces ofscientific, empirical
research, couched in technical language and medical jargon, designed specifically to
withstand academic criticism at the very highest level. The Board justified this
approach by claiming that its primary role was to press forward with fundamental
research on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, present its findings, and not get
involvedinanywiderpropagandawork onits ownbehalf.134Theresult, however, was
that the work of the Board could rarely be easily digested by its main potential
audience: employers, directors, works managers, trade union representatives, and
workers themselves. Veryfew IHRB reports thus soldwell enough to go into a second
edition (i.e., over 1,000). The Board became increasingly aware of this gap in
communication towards the end of the 1930s and appointed a Sub-Committee on
Publicity to investigate. HMSO marketing was criticized as restrictive and its
advertisingasminimal,andreformswereimplemented.135Ashortsynopsisofresearch
wassubsequentlywrittenin"popularlanguage",distributionchannelsopenedupwith
employers' associations, trade unions, and industrial research associations, and
articles popularizing the Board's work forwarded to the press-including, on
occasions, theDaily Mirrorand theDailyHerald. It was notuntil 1943, however, that
the Board initiated a new series of short pamphlets of a non-technical nature
summarizing researchresultsforthespecificuseofindustry. Partoftheprobleminthe
inter-war years, therefore, was a communication gap. Large sections ofindustry were
simply ignorant of the work of the IHRB.
Moreover, as we have already noted, market pressures reduced profit margins to
such an extent that therewas often littlecapital available to finance innovatory health
and welfare schemes, especially amongst the most depression-hit industries and the
smaller firms. The experience ofthe IHRB was that the depression made employers
much more insular and narrowed their horizons as far as labour management was
132 Committee of the Privy Council for Medical Research, 1947, op. cit., note 131 above, p. 22.
33 IHRB, Annual Report, 30 June 1932, p. 41.
34 Ibid., 30 June 1938, pp. 59-60.
s IHRB, Sub-Committee on Publicity, Minutes, 19 January 1939, MRC Archives, File No. 2080/2C.
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concerned.'36 The involvement of industry in the work of the Board registered a
marked decline from 1921 as employers became preoccupied with economy, internal
affairs, and with staying afloat in a much more intensely competitive market
environment. The Management Research Group movement found the same tendency
at work over the 1929-33 slump, when total membership fell from ninety firms to
sixty-three.'37 Employers looked for more tangible, short-term palliatives, such as
slashing wages and increasing workloads. The "more looms" crisis in the cotton-
weaving trade is a case in point.'38 Labour was relatively cheap, plentiful, and better
disciplined during the recession and there was thus less incentive for employers to
develop scientific methods of work which would conserve the energy expenditure,
improve health, and increase the productivity of their workforce. Conditions of
cut-throat competition during the 1920s and 1930s also tended to restrict the impetus
of the employers who were interested in innovations in labour management
techniques. As R. Langford of Renolds explained in a debate on the forty-hour
workingweek: "Alargenumberofworkers wereworkinglonghoursatlowwages. Ina
highly competitive market, the progressive employers were hindered by the price-
cutting ofemployers whose conditions ofemployment and rates ofwages paid were
deplorable."'39
Ignorance of the Board's work and severe financial constraints were significant
factors retarding the penetration ofits ideas. The two variables are interrelated in the
sense that those who were aware of the ideology of the industrial health specialists
would, onepresumes, atleasthaveabsorbed oneofitsmostbasictenets, thatprovision
for industrial health pays in the long term through increased labour efficiency. A
further, crucial factor was the lack of receptivity to new ideas on the part of British
industry, both in terms of worker suspicion and, more significantly, managerial
parochialism. The intensified class conflict and bitterness which characterized the
inter-war period, particularly in the staple industries, was not the sort ofenvironment
that encouraged the formation ofjoint committees to discuss industrial health and
efficiency, a fact recurrently lamented by the IHRB'40 and highlighted by the
Committee on Industry and Trade in 1929.'41 Without such a formal "receiving"
mechanism the work ofthe Board fell largely on deafears. Many workers felt, in the
early days at least, that the IHRB was part ofthe broader rationalization movement,
that efficiency was stressed to the detriment ofwelfare, and that the commitment to
creating a healthy working environment was simply a smokescreen to obscure,
136 IFRB, Annual Report, 31 December 1924, pp. 26-27; 31 December 1926, pp. 18-20; IHRB, Annual
Report, 31 June 1931, p. 77. See also I. H. Charley, The birth ofindustrialnursing, London (1954), 2nd ed.,
London, Bailliere, 1978, p. 90.
137 MRGs, Annual Reports, 1929 and 1933. An indication of the general lack of British interest in the
scientific management movement in the 1920s is the fact that there were only eighteen registered delegates
from Britain out ofsome 1,500 from thirty-five nations at the Fourth International Congress ofScientific
Management, held at Paris in June 1929. See the MRGs, Annual Report, 1929, p. 25.
138 See A. J. Mclvor, 'Employers' associations and industrial relations in Lancashire, 1890-1939', PhD
thesis, Manchester University, 1983, pp. 410-426.
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surreptitious forms of speed-up and intensified effort norms.142 Whilst the Board's
image improved after the appointment ofa trade union representative in 1924, and a
betterknowledgeofitsimpartialorientation spread,still, alegacyofdistrustcontinued
into the early 1930s. This was not least due to the fearofunemployment, exacerbated,
many felt, by the speed-up of work which characterized the 1920s and 1930s.
The initiative for changes in working methods and conditions lay clearly with
management, and indeed, company executives laid great stress on retainingwhat they
regarded as their prerogative to manage, without interference, as they thought fit.
Witness, forexample, the 1922engineeringlock-outonthisissue. Massunemployment
precipitated a collapse in worker bargaining power and many employers responded
not by rationalizing labour management and creating the physiological and
psychological conditions conducive to optimum efficiency, but, altematively with a
fierce labour cost-cutting offensive in the traditional mode of labour management,
incorporating wage reductions, de-manning, intensifying discipline and supervision,
using cheaper forms of labour, speeding-up work, and using various methods of
victimization to weed out militants and protesters.143 This was the predominant
scenario in coal, cotton textiles, shipbuilding, iron and steel, and heavy engineering.
Here, the spectre of high unemployment often induced significant improvements in
productivity and, over the short-term, negated the need to rationalize scientifically
methods of work. So, the response of a large section of industry to the more
competitivemarketenvironmentofthe 1920sand 1930swasintroversion,caution, and
the utilization ofa series ofcustomary time-honoured tactics to slash labour costs.144
Scantregardwasgiventotheprovision ofconditionsconducivetoworkers' healthand
hencetoindustrialefficiency, andlittleattentionwaspaidtothoseidealistswhoargued
that this strategy was a poor long-term investment.145 As the response to the Bedaux
systemindicates, Britishemployersweremoreconcernedtodevelopsystemstocontrol
labour, rather than to improve scientifically worker efficiency, via experimentation
into work methods and energy expenditure.
This poor response ofBritish industry to work measurement and scientific analysis
ofthelabourprocess-andespeciallytheworkofthe IHRBandtheNIIP-waspartly
duetowhatmightbetermedthelack ofascientific andexperimental habitofmind.146
This was in turn largely the product of the relatively poor status of science and
management science in particular in the British education system, especially in
comparison to theposition in the USA and Germany.'47 Employers and managers in
Britain were thus often not in a position to understand or interpret the research
findings ofthe Board, hence the cynical retort ofthe IHRB, that it was amongst this
142 Ibid., p. 147; IHRB, Annual Report, 30 December 1928, pp. 22-23; 30 June 1934, pp. 3-4.
143 Foradiscussionofemployers' broaderlabourrelationsstrategiesandtheroleemployers' associations
played in theinter-war years in oneindustrial region, see Mclvor, op. cit., note 138 above, chs. 8, 9, and 10.
4 IFRB, Annual Report, 31 December 1926, p. 18; IHRB, Annual Report, 31 June 1931, pp. 75, 77.
145 R. M. Wilson, 'The care ofhuman machinery', OxfordLecture Conferences, 25 February 1922, p. 24.
146 Final Report ofthe Committee on Industry and Trade, March 1929, Cd. 3282, p. 216.
147 E. S. Byng, 'Administrative Management in Industry', British Management Review, II, no. 2,
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groupthatvocationalselectionwouldbemostuseful.148 F. W. Leggett,oftheMinistry
ofLabour, wentfurtherbyarguingbluntlythatthevastmajorityofemployersinfirms
with less than 100 workers were "too dumb or too apathetic" to digest the research
findings of the IHRB or the NIIP.149
Therewasaseriouscommunicationgapbetwcenthe Boardandindustry, whichhad
its roots essentially in a clash between practical, hard-headed men of business and
"ivory-tower" academics. The influential technicaljournal Engineering, for example,
argued in 1923 that the work ofthe IHRB and the NIIP was largely theoretical and of
little practical application as it stood.'50 Research conducted by physiologists and
psychologists in laboratories was criticized as being full of misinterpretations.
Moreover, good labour management, continued Engineering, was not subject to
scientific laws, but was the product of "prolonged experience", "intuition", and
"snecessary allowances ... put in by the eye".'5' Judgement based on past experience
was considered preferable to standard methods ofwork measurement. Consequently,
the IHRB and the NIIP failed to attract the general confidence of the post-World
War I engineering employers and indeed, were regarded with something approaching
resentment asusurpers fortheirtemerityin trying to instructexperiencedbusinessmen
andmanagershow best tomanagetheirworkforce. Thislackofconfidenceinthework
ofthe Board and a genuine scientific approach to work was reflected in the fact that
requests for IHRB investigators and surveys in the 1920s and 1930s usually emanated
from government departments, the Factory Inspectorate, the NIIP, and the Industrial
Welfare Society, and only rarely from internal management or employers'
associations.152 At the root of the problem, however, lay the ignorance of British
management when it came to work experience and the labour process. Had managers
been more aware ofthepsychological andphysiological costofmanualwork; hadthey
criticallyobservedmethodsandconditionsofworkintheirfactories, ontheshopfloor,
theymaywell havemodified theirviews towardsfatigue, boredom and monotony,job
specialisation, vocational selection, rest pauses, industrial disease, the work
environment, etc.153
Of course, the weight of customary practice and traditional methods made
habit-breaking particularly difficult. W. H. M. Jackson, of the Institute of Labour
Management, lamented in 1938 that very few managements had developed a clearly
defined personnel policy: "Lip service may be given, but in actual practice, with
comparatively few exceptions, this amounts to little, for the old ideas have sway, and
haphazard methods still prevail and are part ofthe inheritance ofthe past when there
wereample sources oflabour. With relatively fewexceptions, personnel is relegated to
48 IHRB, Annual Report, 30 June 1936, p. 3.
149 F. W. Leggett, 'Industrial relations', British Management Review, III, no. 3, July-September 1938,
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a secondary place, and in the reconstruction years ofthe past decade, industrialists'
thoughts, energies and resources have been mainly devoted to meet material
requirements, rather than human needs and aspirations."154 The creation of the
physiological and psychological conditions conducive to optimum labour efficiency
and health was a low priority for British management in comparison to the attention
given to technical issues, materials, and sales policies.'55
Moreover, management-particularly in the small and medium-sized firms-often
retained many ofthe superstitions and fallacies of the past, including a beliefin the
linearrelationship between hours ofworkand output (aswas shownin the summerof
1940)andarefusaltoacceptTaylor'smaxim(laterabsorbedwithinFordism)thathigh
labour costs could result in lower production costs per unit, if labour management
techniques were rationalized. British employers inthe staple industries appearto have
been obsessed with the idea that slashing wages was the universal solution to all their
problems, and this, together with the industrial relations conflicts and antagonisms it
generated, obscured them from any rational attempt to address the fundamental
problems ofworker inefficiency and poor health. Industry, it was argued, was not a
playground. Many employers were committed to the fallacy that workers should be
seen to be grafting and sweating for their wages, and the idea floated by the HMWC
andextendedbytheIHRBthatworkshouldbeperformedeasily,withtheminimumof
physical andmental strain, was anathema to them.156This goesback to theTaylorian
concept that basically workers were innately lazy and had to be driven by financial
incentives. Here lies the main objection ofBritish management to the implementation
oforganized rest pauses to break up work spells, for this was, as C. Walton ofLever
Brothers argued, simplyencouraging indolence, forworkers wouldcontinue to poach
illicit breaks from production even when definite pauses were introduced.157
Moreover, this was the thin end of the wedge, which might lead to pauses being
introduced in all departments with a commensurate increase in production costs. The
argument that increases in productivity would result from reduced fatigue and
healthier working conditions was still treated broadly with scepticism. Bearing this in
mind and making allowances for the cluster of larger, newer, more progressive
companiesintheexpandingsectorsoftheeconomy, L. Urwick'scommentin 1937that
industry in Britain was still overwhelmingly dominated by "the nepotism, thepolitics
and the traditionalism of the past"158 seems a pertinent one. General standards of
industrial health as a result made only marginal progress.
CONCLUSIONS
Thisessay hasmade an assessment ofthe origins, thework, the orientation, and the
achievement ofthe Industrial Health Research Board, and through this medium, an
'5 W. H. M. Jackson, 'A labour policy', ibid., p. 85.
155 Ibid., p. 92. And see R. Coppock, 'Management and labour relations ofthe future', ibid., IV, no. 4,
October-December 1939, p. 33.
'56 E. Farmer, 'Time and motion study', IFRB Report No. 14, 1921, p. 27.
57 MRG 1, Minutes ofthe LabourSection, discussion on fatigue and restpauses, 3 March 1932, pp. 8-9.
158 L. Urwick, 'The scientific management movement', British Management Review, II, no. 2, April-June
1937, p. 17.
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attempt has been made to shed some insight into the general question of health and
efficiency at work during the inter-war years. It has been shown how the Board
emerged out of the war emergency, 1914-18, as a progression from the more limited
work ofthe HMWC. It pioneered the scientific study ofwork in Britain and its main
achievement was in vastly extending theoretical knowledge of the physiological and
psychological principles governing the healthy and most efficient employment of
workers in industry. Its research reports are an exhaustive datasourceon thewaywork
was organized in Britain and the impact ofoccupation on workers' health. The Board
identified and exposed problems ofindustrial health and advocated a whole range of
preventive measures, including reduced working hours, rest pauses, redesign of the
labourprocess, vocational selection and training, and the reorganization ofthe general
work environment conducive to the highest standards of industrial health.
Its orientation and its motivations are revealing. Its ideology squarely bridged that
of the American-inspired efficiency engineering movement and the endogenous
welfarist school, epitomized by Cadbury and Rowntree. It advocated a more scientific
approach to labourmanagement via detailed investigation and experimentation in the
workplace, usingtime andmotion studies, amongst other techniques. This earned it, at
least initially, the distrust of organized labour. Yet the Board distanced itself from
American management techniques and stressed a much more personal approach,
arguing repeatedly that workers were complex psychological and physiological
organisms exhibitinggreat diversityin energy levels and capacity to work. Theprimary
object of the Board's work studies was to improve standards of workers' health. Its
motivations, however, were not entirely altruistic, paternalist, or humanitarian in the
traditional welfarist sense. It continually emphasized that industrial medicine paid
dividends in terms of enhanced worker productivity and thus industrial efficiency;
crudely, that there was a direct correlation between standards ofworkers' fitness and
health and profit margins in British industry.
The diffusion ofthe IHRB's findings and the penetration ofits ideology was limited
prior to World War II. It has been argued that the large employers in the expanding,
modern sector ofthe economy were most receptive to innovatory labour management
ideasemanating fromthe Board, and thatitwas in this sector thatindustrial healthwas
qualitatively improving in the inter-war period. Moreover, the government took the
initiative inthe 1937 Factories Actto incorporate anumber ofthe Board's findings and
modestly to raise basic standards of health, safety, and welfare at work. This was a
significant watershed. However, prior to 1937-8, there is evidence of a growing
dichotomy in health standards at work between the new industries and the older,
depressed staple sector of the economy, where working conditions deteriorated and
where absorption of scientific management ideas on the physiological and
psychological conditions conducive to industrial efficiency and workers' health were
negligible.'59 Indeed, most ofBritish industry registered a negative response to IHRB
159 H. Jones has noted that "inequalities in standards ofsafety and conditions ofhealth between firms and
regions increased as the legal standards remained those laid down in the 1901 Factory and Workshop Act".
See H. Jones, 'An inspector calls: health and safety at work in inter-war Britain', in Weindling, op. cit., note 2
above, p. 223.
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ideology and remained committed to traditional labour management methods. This
was the result partly ofpoormarketing methods by the Board and partly offinancial
constraints in a period ofrecession militating against change. Primarily, however, the
lack ofprogress has its roots in the poor receptivity of British industry to scientific
concepts and particularly the narrow parochialism and traditional fallacies ofmany,
though not all, employers and managers. This is a salutary reminder that
generalizations based on the best practice of the thin strand of "progressive" large
firmsin Britaincanproducedistortions ofreality. Infact, intheolder, staplesectorsof
the economy the penetration of "scientific management" was negligible, industrial
health at best stagnated, and for a large number ofworkers qualitatively deteriorated
prior to 1937-8. In the larger firms, in the newer relatively prosperous sectors, there
wereadvances, yetthepotentialforimprovingworkers'health,welfare,andefficiency,
asindicatedbythepioneeringresearch workoftheHMWCandthe IHRB, wasrarely
realized in inter-war workshop practice.
189